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TRIAL TACTICS

The Limitation on Exclusion
of Extrinsic Evidence
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

F

ederal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the
admission of extrinsic evidence “to prove specific
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack
or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” The
rule was amended in 2003 to substitute the words “character for truthfulness” for the word “credibility” in an
effort to make clear that the intent of the prohibition on
extrinsic evidence was and is to exclude extrinsic evidence offered to prove a witness’s general propensity for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Despite the Advisory Committee’s effort to clarify the limits on the ban on extrinsic
evidence, courts frequently find the rule confusing. Most
states have similar rules that are equally confusing.

United States v. Delgado-Marrero

An illustrative case is United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2014), in which two police
officers were charged and convicted of drug and firearm offenses. The case arose from an FBI reverse
sting—Operation Guard Shack—during which the
FBI recruited two police officers to assist the agency
in combatting police corruption in Puerto Rico. Officer I posed as a corrupt policeman with close ties to
a mid- to high-level local drug dealer, and Officer II
played the role of the dealer. The defendant officers
were Raquel Delgado-Marrero (Delgado) and Angel
Rivera-Claudio (Rivera), working partners at the Antillas Police Precinct in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Rule
608(b) issue in the case involved only Delgado, and the
discussion here is largely confined to her.

Getting Involved

Delgado began as a municipal police officer in her late
20s. Before the sting operation, she had five years of
experience on the force, established a clean disciplinary record without a single administrative complaint
filed against her, and received the Municipal Police
Woman of 2009 award.
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In mid-2009, Officer I, who had grown up with Delgado and gone to school and shared friends with her,
reached out to her in his undercover role as a corrupt
policeman. Although they had lost touch over the years,
Officer I decided to renew contact after meeting with
Delgado’s ex-husband on an unrelated matter. Officer I learned from her ex-husband that Delgado was
now divorced and had several part-time jobs providing nighttime security at veterinary clinics and pubs in
“unsafe locations”—a term the officer interpreted to
mean places where drug trafficking occurred.
Obtaining Delgado’s phone number from the exhusband, Officer I called and talked with her twice. But
despite instructions from the FBI, he failed to record
either call. Finally, on July 20, 2009, Officer I made
a third phone call and recorded a conversation with
Delgado in which it was clear that during the previous
calls she had already accepted his invitation to act as
security during a drug transaction for which she and
an unnamed fellow officer (later identified as Rivera)
would be paid $2,000 each.
Three days later, Officer I recorded another call
in which he explained to Delgado how and where
the transaction would take place. He told her that
she and Rivera would be directed to a house and
required to frisk two individuals involved in the drug
buy to ensure that neither individual brought a gun
into the house.
The next day, on July 24, 2009, Officer I was on the
phone providing minute-by-minute directions to Delgado and Rivera that led them to an apartment outfitted
by the FBI with hidden cameras and microphones,
where Officer I and Officer II (the “drug dealer”)
were waiting. When Delgado and Rivera arrived,
the two were offered refreshments, and, for about 30
minutes, the four of them engaged in friendly banter. When someone knocked on the door, Rivera was
told to answer it and make certain no one entered the
apartment armed. Officer I signaled Delgado to assist.
After they cleared the man acting as the drug buyer,
everyone moved back to the living room and the casual
conversation continued until the buyer asked to see the
“stuff,” saying he was ready to leave. Rivera was told
to retrieve a duffle bag that contained dummy packages wrapped to look like “bricks” of cocaine—and
after examining the contents in view of both Rivera and
Delgado, the buyer shook hands with everyone, put the
bag over his shoulder, and left. Officer I handed Rivera
$4,000 in cash, Rivera counted it, and both Delgado
and Rivera stated they were available for a second job.
The FBI did not arrest Delgado and Rivera until
October 6, 2010, when they were indicted on four
counts charging them with conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine, aiding and abetting
another in an attempt to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine, and knowingly possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.
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Delgado’s Defense: Entrapment

Given the facts set forth above, it is not difficult to
understand why Delgado did not deny she had agreed
to participate in what was an apparent drug deal. It is
much more difficult to understand Rivera’s defense,
which was that Rivera had no intention of participating in the transaction before Delgado lured him into
it. Although there were taped calls between Officer I
and Rivera, the other trial evidence implicated him as
much as Delgado.
The government presented the testimony of Officers I and II and of the FBI agent who had prepared
the apartment and provided the material used in the
staged drug transaction. The government also introduced the two recorded calls between Officer I and
Delgado, the video recording of the transaction, and
five pictures of the “bricks” that were placed in the
apartment by the FBI.
Delgado defended by claiming that she was
entrapped by Officer I. Under federal law (unlike
some states that focus objectively on the government’s
conduct), entrapment has two components: (1) the
government has taken steps to induce the accused to
engage in criminal conduct, and (2) the accused was
not predisposed to engage in that conduct.

Delgado’s Testimony

Delgado testified that over a period of a month, Officer I persistently offered her part-time employment,
repeatedly called her, and sometimes took her out on
dates; that he had a romantic, sexual affair with her in
2005 and 2009; and that several weeks after the sting
operation, he took her out on a date during which they
had sexual intercourse. Delgado contended that she
finally gave in to Officer I’s pressure.
The Rule 608(b) issue first arose before she took
the stand during the cross-examination of Officer I and
again when Delgado sought to offer the testimony of
an acquaintance of Officer I, Brenda Rosa-Valentín.

Cross-Examination of Officer I

During cross-examination of Officer I, the government
objected to a question regarding his recollection of his
interactions with Rosa-Valentín. Delgado’s counsel
proffered at a sidebar conference that Rosa-Valentín
would testify that Officer I had offered her money in
exchange for providing contact information of potential
police officers to entrap, and confessed to her his desire
to kill a man he thought had wronged her brother. The
judge indicated that he would not permit such questions unless he first heard from Rosa-Valentín, but he
would permit Delgado to recall Officer I if a proper
foundation were laid for the questions.
Delgado’s counsel got Officer I to admit that he had
offered money to Rosa-Valentín in exchange for police
officers’ names. Officer I said that he first mentioned

the offer to Rosa-Valentín during a chance encounter while on duty when he responded to a late-night
complaint of loud music during her birthday party at a
commercial establishment. He denied, however, drinking beer at the party or allowing the party to continue
after closing time in violation of a municipal ordinance.
He also denied going to Rosa-Valentín’s house more
than 15 times in the days following the birthday party.
After the government rested, Delgado sought to call
Rosa-Valentín as her counsel had previously proffered.
The government objected that her testimony was irrelevant. Delgado’s counsel repeated the proffer made
during cross-examination, and the trial judge stated
that he would hear the evidence outside the presence
of the jury.
Outside the jury’s presence, Rosa-Valentín testified
that Officer I was her brother’s life-long friend, that
she had known him for more than 30 years, and that
Officer I twice stated during funeral services for her
brother’s wife that he wanted to kill the man who he
felt was responsible for her suicide. She also stated that
Officer I told her about his shakedowns of drug dealers
and fabrication of cases. She stated that Officer I had
eight or nine beers at her birthday party and permitted
it to continue until 4:30 a.m., and that Officer I came
to her house the next day and persistently (sometimes
up to seven times a day) for four months sought the
names of police officers who could do some part-time
work for him. He also offered her part-time work. The
trial judge excluded the testimony as extrinsic evidence
barred by Rule 608(b).

The Court of Appeals’ Holding

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, finding that the excluded testimony was
not extrinsic evidence barred by Rule 608(b). The court
instead reasoned “that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony would
have shown how Officer I went about his participation
in Operation Guard Shack and would thus support [Delgado’s] entrapment defense.” (Delgado-Marrero, 744
F.3d at 180.) The court explained that Rosa-Valentín’s
testimony was similar to Delgado’s and painted a picture of Officer I as relentlessly pursuing police officers
as targets of the sting operation, including those who
were not known as corrupt officers. Excerpts from the
court’s opinion highlight its reasoning:
Delgado avers that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony
contradicted Officer I’s in several respects, and
it is clear from the record that this was the case.
Officer I, among other things, disavowed constantly visiting Rosa-Valentín after her birthday,
whereas in her proffer she stated that it was precisely thereafter that Officer I harassed her for
approximately four months, insisting that he be
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provided with contact information of police officers to do part-time work, sometimes going to
her house more than seven times per day. Rule
608(b) does not preclude the introduction of this
type of impeachment evidence.

More importantly, however, we agree with Delgado that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony would have
shown how Officer I went about his participation
in Operation Guard Shack and would thus support her entrapment defense.

It is black-letter law that an entrapment defense
has two elements: (1) government inducement of
the accused to engage in criminal conduct, and
(2) the accused’s lack of predisposition to engage
in such conduct. In connection with the inducement prong, Rosa-Valentín and Delgado painted
a similar picture of Officer I’s relentless pursuit
of Operation Guard Shack part-time workers.
Rosa-Valentín testified that Officer I offered her
large amounts of money and pursued her for four
months—sometimes going to her house more
than seven times a day—trying to win her over
so that she would provide contact information for
part-time employees. In Delgado’s case, she testified that Officer I courted her almost daily for
approximately one month before she capitulated.

Delgado’s and Rosa-Valentín’s testimonies similarly reflected that Officer I tried to lure them into
Operation Guard Shack activities by appealing
to their long-lasting friendships. Delgado’s and
Rosa-Valentín’s testimonies also reflected that
Officer I attempted to manipulate his way around
potential targets’ reluctance to participate in an
Operation Guard Shack “part-time.” . . .

F u r t h e r m o r e , R o s a - Va l e n t í n ’s t e s t i mony supported the propensity prong of
Delgado’s entrapment defense. For example,
Rosa-Valentín’s testimony showed that Officer I’s pursuit of potential Operation Guard
Shack targets was not limited to corrupt officers. In this regard, she testified that Officer I
persistently asked her for contact information
of police officers, even though she told him
she knew only officers seemingly involved in

legitimate part-time work (her exact words on
this were: “They worked at gas stations, that kind
of thing”). Rosa-Valentín also testified that Officer I invited her to participate in a “part-time”
herself, despite the fact that she had no criminal record, links to the drug-trafficking trade,
or involvement with the police force. Delgado
testified similarly, stating that her untarnished
criminal record shows that she had no inclination to engage in illegal activities before Officer
I’s month-long pursuit.
(Id. at 179–81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
The court of appeals was critical of the government’s argument concerning Rule 608(b), observing
that the government’s entire argument in its brief was
that “[t]he court correctly found [Rosa-Valentín’s]
testimony inadmissible under Rule 608(b), which
only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the conduct
is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” (Id. at 181 (alterations in
original).) The court responded to this argument by
saying, “We have stated many times that such a lackadaisical effort is insufficient to carry the day.” (Id.)
More importantly, however, the court specifically
held that the excluded evidence was not barred by
Rule 608(b) because it was probative of Delgado’s
entrapment defense.

An Important Point

The court of appeals recognized something that must
be kept in mind: “While it may be true that RosaValentín’s testimony incidentally called into question
Officer I’s character for truthfulness, without more,
such an effect does not render the testimony inadmissible.” (Id.) In short, evidence that is offered for a proper
purpose (here, to prove entrapment) may have the additional effect of impeaching a witness such as Officer
I, but when offered for a permissible purpose that evidence is not excluded by Rule 608(b).

Other Government Arguments

Although the focus here is on Rule 608(b), two other
government arguments warrant brief mention. First,
the government argued that the testimony by RosaValentín would have been improper “collateral”
impeachment. This argument serves to remind that
there is no prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence
on impeachment on a collateral matter. There is only
Rule 608(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence offered for a
particular purpose. Arguments about “collateralness”
are decided under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and
in this case the court of appeals clearly identified the
importance of the excluded evidence.
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Second, the government argued that Rosa-Valentín’s
testimony was improper prior bad acts testimony and
was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b)(1). This argument serves to remind that even
when Rule 608(b) is not a bar to admission of evidence,
another rule might be. But in this case, the evidence
was used to show the methods used by Officer I to
carry out his duties in the reverse sting operation, not
to show his character generally.

Lessons

1. There is no general rule excluding evidence as
collateral. Arguments about the collateral nature
of evidence are properly addressed under Rule
403.
2. Rule 608(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence is limited to situations in which a party seeks to offer

evidence of acts that a witness has denied for the
purpose of showing that those acts occurred and
suggest that the witness is an untruthful person.
3. Evidence offered to show that a police officer
engaged in acts that might demonstrate entrapment are not offered to suggest that the officer
is untruthful.
4. If the officer denies the acts relied on to prove
entrapment, evidence that the acts occurred might
have the incidental effect of impeaching the officer, but as long as the acts are offered to prove
entrapment they are offered for a permissible
purpose.
5. Courts of appeal do not appreciate arguments
made in a single sentence to defend an important decision of a trial judge that is central to a
defendant’s criminal appeal. n
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